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Note: Trademark Protection of Objects and
Configurations: A Critical Analysis
The law has long reflected a tension between the desire of
manufacturers to copy their competitor's products and ideas and
the desire of the competitors to prevent such copying.1 One area
which has been most affected by this tension is that of legal pro-
tection of the shape or configuration of a manufacturer's pro-
duct.2 Manufacturers have argued that the physical shape or
configuration of a product or container identifies the producer
to the consuming public, and that therefore the law should
prohibit imitation of these patterns. A possible statutory re-
sponse to this argument is trademark registration under the Lan-
ham Trademark Act,3 which is available for a broad range of
shapes and configurations. The kinds of objects which may be
granted such registration have grown in number over the last
twenty years, however, until the protection now extends well
beyond the original rationale of assuring source identification.
For example, registrations under the Lanham Trademark Act
have been attempted for beverage containers,4 the shape of a ta-
ble,5 and other configurations6 at least arguably intended to do
1. See generally F. ScEmc'R, HIsTOR CAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS (1925).
2. Precisely speaking, the law does not protect the product itself,
but rather the manufacturer's rights in the product: the patent statute
confers the right to prevent any unauthorized manufacture, while the
trademark statute grants a right to prevent use of the product as an indi-
cator of source. In common parlance, however, these statutes are said
to protect the product, and that phraseology will be used in this Note.
In a similar manner, the term "object" will be used more or less inter-
changeably with "shape" and "configuration." Although it is not techni-
cally accurate to say, for example, that a manufacturer can obtain trade-
mark protection for an object when what is really meant is its shape
or design, in many cases the distinction is a meaningless one. It mat-
ters very little, for example, whether one refers to protection of the Hon-
eywell thermostat cover itself or of its shape. See notes 137-45 infra and
accompanying text. On the other hand, the term "pattern' will be used
to indicate a quite distinct part of an object, such as the pattern on a
china plate.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July
5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427).
4. Examples include the Haig and Haig "Pinch Bottle," the Mogen
David wine decanter, and the Pepsi-Cola bottle. See notes 22, 52, and
70 infra.
5. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
6. See, e.g., In re Mem Co., 165 U.S.P.Q. 88 (T.T.A.B. 1970)
(barrel-shaped closure on cosmetics bottles); In re International Playtex
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more than identify the product and its manufacturer.
Besides registration under the Lanham Act, there are other
possible sources of protection for product shapes and configura-
tions. These include mechanical and design patents, copyrights,
and the common law of unfair competition. The various protec-
tions frequently overlap, however. For nonmechanical, non-
written shapes and configurations, the most likely overlap or con-
flict with the trademark system occurs when the item in question
is covered by a design patent. The extent to which this conflict
exists will be an important factor in determining whether trade-
mark protection should be extended to include product designs.
The purpose of this Note is to examine critically the use of
trademark protection to prevent the copying of product configu-
rations. The conclusion which will be reached as a result of this
analysis is that the number of occasions on which Lanham Act
registration is permitted for product configurations should be
sharply limited. Alternative methods of controlling or restrict-
ing the scope of trademark protection will then be discussed.
I. THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. TRADEmARK PRoTEcTIoN
The Lanham Trademark Act of 19457 provides protection for
trademarks that are registered on either its Principal or its Sup-
plemental Register. A manufacturer who seeks listing on the
Principal Register must show that his trademark s is inherently
distinctive9 or has acquired secondary meaning as an indicator
of the product's source.10 Once a trademark has been entered
Corp., 155 U.S.P.Q. 745 (T.T.A.B. 1967) (tubular-shaped girdle con-
tainer); In re Tri-X Corp., 154 U.S.P.Q. 379 (T.T.A.B. 1967) (pellet-
shaped cooling system product).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1970).
8. A trademark is defined by the Act as a "word, name, symbol,
or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufac-
turer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those
manufactured or sold by others." Id. § 1127.
9. Section 2(f) of the Act requires that the trademark be distinc-
tive of the applicant's goods or services. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1970).
Unless secondary meaning-actual operation of the symbol as an indi-
cator of source-is shown, the item must be inherently distinctive in
order to qualify for protection on the Principal Register. For example,
in In re Mcllhenney Co., 278 F.2d 953 (C.C.P.A. 1960), the court found
that the applicant's pepper sauce (Tabasco sauce) bottle was not inher-
ently distinctive and denied registration. The applicant had not proved
secondary meaning.
10. Secondary meaning denotes the actual operation in trade of the
symbol as an indicator of source and therefore satisfies the statutory re-
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on the Principal Register, its owner can prevent registration of
similar or confusing marks"1 and secure injunctive relief and
damages against infringers 12 in federal court.13 In addition, the
owner can prevent the importation of goods with infringing
marks,14 assert the registration in court as prima facie evidence
of his right to exclusive use,' 5 and after five years' use have the
mark treated as incontestable. 16
An applicant for supplemental registration, on the other
hand, need only show that his mark 7 is "capable of distin-
guishing applicant's goods or services"'I s in order to qualify for
the protection of that register. This is a significantly less
restrictive requirement than that demanded for the Principal
Register, since the Supplemental Register requires only that the
symbol possess the potential for distinguishing the manufactur-
er's good, rather than the actual ability to distinguish necessary
for principal registration. The protections afforded the supple-
mental registrant are correspondingly limited to the ability to
prevent registration of confusing marks' 9 and the right to injunc-
tive relief20 and damages in federal court.2 '
The rationale for providing two registers rather than a single
one is unclear; but there is some suggestion that the reason for
creating the Supplemental Register was to allow domestic manu-
facturers to register certain trademarks in foreign countries. 22
Thus, the provision of supplemental registration in this country
now makes it possible for a manufacturer to insure the exclusive
use of his symbol in countries that refuse protection to marks
quirement that the symbol be "distinctive of applicant's goods." 15
U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1970).
11. Id. § 1052(d).
12. Id. §§ 1114, 1116, 1117.
13. Id. § 1121.
14. Id. § 1124.
15. Id. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a).
16. Id. §§ 1065, 1115(b).
17. '"ark" is a less specific term than "trademark." It is defined
to include symbols-such as trademarks, service marks, collective marks,
or certification marks-which are entitled to registration whether or not
actually registered. Id. § 1127.
18. Ad. § 1091.
19. Id. § 1052(d).
20. Id. §§ 1114, 1116, 1117.
21. Id § 1121.
22. See In re Pepsi-Cola Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 468 (T.T.A.B. 1959); Ex
parte Caron Corp., 100 U.S.P.Q. 356 (Dec. Com. Pat. 1954); Hearings on
H.R. 4744 Before the Trademark Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 125-37 (1939).
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not registered in the country of origin.23  Textual evidence that
this was the congressional intent is provided by the language
of section 23 of the Act, which applies only to the Supplemental
Register:
Upon q proper showing by the applicant that he requires
domestic registration as a basis for foreign protection of his
mark, the Commissioner may waive the requirement of a full
year's use and may grant registration forthwith.2 4
Certain sections of the Act have particular relevance to the
protection of configurations and three-dimensional objects. Sec-
tion 23 provides that marks registrable on the Supplemental
Register may include configurations of goods.25  Section 2(f)
states that "[e]xcept as expressly provided in . . . this section,
nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark
used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the appli-
cant's goods in commerce. '2 6 The Commissioner of Patents has
read these two sections together as establishing that containers
are configurations of goods and thus may qualify for the protec-
tion of the Supplemental Register, with graduation to the
Principal Register upon proof of established secondary mean-
ing.27
B. PATENT PRoTEcTIoN
Patent protection 28 represents a second statutory method
of preventing one's competitors from copying products and con-
figurations. Although utility patents29 are occasionally employed
23. In re Pepsi-Cola Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 468, 469 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1091 (1970).
25. For the purposes of registration on the supplemental reg-
ister, a mark may consist of any trademark, symbol, label, pack-
age, configuration of goods, name, word, slogan, phrase, sur-
name, geographical name, numeral or device or any combination
of the foregoing, but such mark must be capable of distinguish-
ing the applicant's goods or services.
Id. § 1091.
26. Id. § 1052 (f). For a list of the narrow exceptions of the section,
see note 159 infra.
27. In Ex parte Boye Needle Co., 100 U.S.P.Q. 124 (Dec. Com. Pat.
1953), and Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. 74 (Dec.
Com. Pat. 1952), the Commissioner refused principal registration for con-
tainers. In Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Dec. Com. Pat.
1958), that position was repudiated and the Pinch bottle-which had
been listed on the Supplemental Register-was granted principal regis-
tration.
28. Title 35, U.S.C. (1970).
29. "Utility patent" refers to the monopoly protection granted to in-
ventive creations, other than ornamental designs, under the United States
patent statutes. The invention must be unanticipated, as well as previ-
ously unknown and unpatented. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970). The holder of
[Vol. 59:541
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for this purpose, design patents are usually more suitable for ob-
jects or configurations which might conceivably be granted trade-
mark registration. Thus, design patents are the restriction on
imitation most likely to conflict with Lanham Act protection.
A design patent may be granted for "any new, original and
ornamental design for an article of manufacture, 3 0 if the design
meets the general requirements applicable to all patents. The
most notable of these are the requisites of invention, novelty,
and originality.31 Once granted, the patent gives its holder the
right to exclusive control of the design for a period of up to 14
years.32 The burden of showing invalidity of the patent is on
the party challenging it.3 3 Remedies 34 for infringement include
injunctive relief33 and damages,3 6 with minimum damages being
at least equal to a reasonable royalty and subject to tripling at
the court's discretion.3 7 Attorneys' fees may also be awarded in
exceptional cases.38
The design patent, however, has proved to be an exceedingly
unreliable device for preventing imitation. Many patent appli-
cants have found it difficult to demonstrate the necessary novelty
and originality.30 In addition, courts have been reluctant to up-
the patent is given the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling the invention throughout the United States for 17 years, 35 U.S.C.§ 154 (1970), and also is provided a substantial array of remedies for
infringement, 35 U.S.C. §§ 281-93 (1970).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1970).
31. A "design patent, in order to be valid, must disclose a design
that is new, original and ornamental, unanticipated and inventive in
character, and beyond the skill of the ordinary designer or draftsman."
Amerock Corp. v. Aubrey Hardware Mfg., Inc., 275 F.2d 346, 348 (7th
Cir. 1960). See also Capex Co. v. Schwartz, 166 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1948);
In re Stevens, 173 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1949).
32. At the applicant's option, the patent may be issued for a period
of 3h, 7, or 14 years. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1970).
33. Id. § 282.
34. Id. § 281.
35. Id. § 283.
36. Id. § 284.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 285.
39. See, e.g., Thabet Mfg. Co. v. Kool Vent Metal Awning Corp.,
226 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1955) (design patent on awning invalid for lack
of invention over prior art); Metal Industries, Inc. v. Brauning, 297 F.
856 (8th Cir. 1922) (design patent for kiddy car denied since substitu-
tion of wood for metal in construction insufficiently inventive); W.A.
Baum Co. v. Propper Mfg. Co., 343 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (de-
sign patent for wall-mounted sphygmomanometer invalid for lack of
novelty); Blisscraft v. Rona Plastic Corp., 123 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) (butter dish design denied patent because not sufficiently novel).
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hold the design patents granted by the Patent Office.40
II. THE FUNCTIONALITY LIMITATION ON
TRADEMARK PROTECTION
In order to understand fully the protections which are avail-
able for a product's shape or configuration, it is necessary to ex-
plore a common law concept which has often been used by courts
to limit registrations under the Lanham Act: the doctrine of
functionality.41 Simply stated, this doctrine provides that func-
tional features of products will not be protected from copying.42
One motivation behind the development of this doctrine was the
desire to assure the continued potency of the common law right
to copy essential features of marketable products.43 Obviously,
the doctrine's impact on trademark protection of product confi-
gurations will depend greatly on the breadth given to the
definition of "functional": a liberal definition of the concept will
increase the scope of permissible copying by diminishing the
number of cases in which protection will be afforded.
A generally accepted44 definition of what is functional is
offered by the Restatement of Torts: "A feature of goods is func-
tional . . . if it affects their purpose, action or performance, or
the facility or economy of processing, handling or using them; it
is non-functional if it does not have any of such effects."45 This
definition appears to be intended to provide an "objective" test
for functionality-that is, if the product possesses any feature
40. For example, between 1937 and 1960 the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit invalidated 22 design patents and upheld none. Am-
erock Corp. v. Aubrey Hardware Mfg., Inc., 275 F.2d 346, 349 n.1 (7th
Cir. 1960).
41. See, e.g., Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Watson, 150 F. Supp. 861(D.D.C. 1957); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d (C.C.P.A. 1964);
In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
42. Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160 (2d Cir. 1904). For a compre-
hensive discussion of the doctrine of functionality, see Note, Unfair Com-
petition and the Doctrine of Functionality, 64 CoLum. L. Rxv. 544 (1964).
43. See notes 92-93 infra.
44. "[D]ecisional law has generally supported the view of the Re-
statement." Note, supra note 42, at 562. See, e.g., Norwich Pharmacal
Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1959), cert denied, 362
U.S. 919 (1960) (pink color of Pepto Bismol is functional); Pagliero v.
Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952) (designs on hotel china
are functional); J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d
949 (8th Cir. 1941) (pocket design has commercial appeal and is func-
tional); Sylvania Elec. Prods. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 144 F. Supp. 112(D.N.J. 1956), aff'd 247 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1957) (blue dot on flashbulb
is functional).
45. RESTATEMENT or ToRTs § 742 (1938).
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which displays the effects listed, the product is functional regard-
less of any countervailing considerations. Many courts have
applied the test in this way.40
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, however, has
dealt with the issue in a manner which clouds the simple lan-
guage of the Restatement test. For example, in In re Deister
Concentrator Co.,4 7 the court rejected an application for registra-
tion of the company's rhomboid-shaped shaking table on the
Principal Register, citing the Restatement definition. The ration-
ale for holding the Deister shape functional was said to be not
that "the shape possesses utility, but that it is in essence utili-
tarian." 48 In In re Simmons Co.,49 the same court reversed the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's denial of supplemental
registration for a mattress stitching pattern, noting that the
board had not found the pattern "inherently functional." 50 Both
these characterizations suggest that the court is balancing or
weighing functional and nonfunctional considerations, rather
than simply applying the Restatement test. Such departures
from an "objective" test not only make the Restatement defini-
tion harder to apply and increase uncertainty in the area, but
also dilute what was originally a broad denial of trademark pro-
tection, thus decreasing the scope of permitted copying contrary
to the apparent intent of the restaters and the courts that first
forged the doctrine.51
Further deprecation of the functionality concept has come
from several prominent cases which have allowed registration
of product configurations without addressing that issue directly.
For example, in Ex parte Haig and Haig Ltd.,52 the Pinch
whiskey bottle was placed on the Principal Register without dis-
cussion of functionality. The Commissioner apparently felt that,
since the bottle had previously been listed on the Supplemental
Register,5 3 secondary meaning was the only relevant issue.
Similarly, when the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Com-
pany (3M) sought to record the triangular shape of a chemical
46. See cases cited in note 44 supra.
47. 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
48. Id. at 506 (emphasis in original).
49. 278 F.2d 517 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
50. Id. at 519.
51. Modern Grinder Mfg. Co. v. Dazey Churn & Mfg. Co., 22 F.2d
950 (7th Cir. 1927); Marvel Co. v. Pearl, 133 F. 160 (2d Cir. 1904); Cham-
pion Spark Plug Co. v. A.R. Mosler & Co., 233 F. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
52. 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Dec. Com. Pat. 1958).
53. Id. at 229 n.1.
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composition on the Supplemental Register,54 the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board refused registration on a ground other than
functionality.55 In reversing the Board's decision, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals did not really consider functional-
ity, finding merely that the composition's shape had no functional
significance "so far as the record shows." 56 Such a reluctance
to inquire into this issue sets a precedent which could substan-
tially erode the functionality doctrine. The importance of the
concept, however, has been reaffirmed in other cases. In the
recent case of In re Honeywell, Inc.,57 the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals emphasized the importance of the functionality
limitation. The court reversed the denial by the Trademark Trial
and Appeals Board of principal registration of the company's
round thermostat cover, but it remanded for consideration of the
functionality issue which the Board had not addressed. An
application for certiorari in this case was recently denied;58 thus
the scope of this doctrine remains in doubt.
The Restatement definition of functionality, when properly
applied, is a broad one. The comment to that formulation ex-
pands it even further, demonstrating that the drafters intended
the definition to include aspects of goods which operate only to
make the goods attractive and therefore marketable:
When goods are bought largely for their aesthetic value, their
features may be functional because they definitely contribute
to that value and thus aid the performance of an object for
which the goods are intended. Thus, the shape of a bottle or
other container may be functional though a different bottle or
container may hold the goods equally well.... The determina-
tion of whether or not such features are functional depends upon
the question of fact whether prohibition of imitation by others
will deprive the others of something which will substantially
hinder them in competition.5 9
54. In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A.
1964).
55. The Board based its decision on a claimed longstanding inter-
pretation of "configuration of goods" which limited that phrase to a sin-
gle element of a product and not to the entire configuration or shape.
Examples of this interpretation are Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Watson, 150
F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1957); Ex parte Mars Signal-Light Corp., 85
U.S.P.Q. 173 (Dec. Com. Pat. 1950). The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals rejected the interpretation in the 3M case. 335 F.2d at 837.
56. 335 F.2d at 840.
57. 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
58. 43 U.S.L.W. 3349 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1974).
59. RESTATEmENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 742, comment a
(1938). See also id. § 741 and Explanatory Notes, which discuss the ap-
plication of the functionality principle to the law of unfair competition.
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Thus, the comment recognizes that form may be functional-a
concept that has been termed "esthetic functionality." In addi-
tion, it also emphasizes that a proper test for esthetic function-
ality is keyed to the competitive result of the feature in question
rather than to the manufacturer's intent or purpose. That is,
a feature is functional if it affects competition, regardless of
whether that attribute was meant to perform a particular
function.
The leading case endorsing esthetic functionality is Pagliero
v. Wallace China Co.,6° in which the plaintiff sought damages
and an injunction against use by a competitor of a name and
design similar to that employed on the plaintiff's hotel china.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin
imitation of the pattern, holding that the decorative features of
china are very closely related to its salability and are therefore
"functional." 61 The court then stated a test that closely parallels
the "competitive result" standard of the Restatement: "If the
particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial
success of the product, the interest in free competition permits
its imitation in the absence of a patent or copyright. '6 2  The
Restatement standard has also apparently been approved by
other courts. For example, in an earlier Eighth Circuit opinion,
J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 63 the court refused
to hold that the defendant had competed unfairly by copying
the pocket design from the front of bib overalls sold by the plain-
tiff, since the design had commercial appeal and was therefore
functional.6 4 Consistent with the "competitive result" test, the
opinion recognized that the concept of functionality includes fea-
tures which are not strictly utilitarian, but which result in
increased sales. Similarly, a district court in the Fifth Circuit
recently endorsed the marketing aspect of functionality in Boston
Professional Hockey Association Inc. v. Emblem Manufacturing
Co.0 5 The plaintiff there sought to enjoin the defendant from
manufacturing cloth emblems embodying the registered trade-
60. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
61. Although the court of appeals reversed the district court's grant
of a preliminary injunction as to the use of the design, it left the injunc-
tion in force with regard to the defendant's use of the same names for
the pattern. Id. at 344.
62. Id. at 343.
63. 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941).
64. "The bib pocket design here under consideration seems to us
to have a clear commercial appeal that goes beyond the aspect of merely
identifying the garment or its source of production." Id. at 954.
65. 360 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
marks of National Hockey League teams. The court, citing
Pagliero, went on to state that "[w]hen an artistic rendition
creates a demand in the market which is unrelated to its feature
as an indicia of source, the law will not afford that design pro-
tection under the trademark laws. In the instant case, the reg-
istered trademark is, in effect, the product itself."66 The injunc-
tion was denied.67
Not all courts, however, have shown as willing an accept-
ance of esthetic functionality as they have of the general func-
tionality limitation. For example, one court apparently held that
the function of an ashtray is to hold ashes, shape and appearance
being therefore nonfunctional.68 Another court seemingly found
that the only function of a decorative clock costing 175 dollars
was to tell time.69 The concept of esthetic functionality was sug-
gested in In re Mogen David Wine Corp.,70 but the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals rejected it quite summarily, describ-
ing the argument as "ingenious" and finding no support for it
in the cases cited.71
In summary, the functionality doctrine, if broadly inter-
preted, can serve to assure public access to valuable products.
In order for it to so operate, however, the doctrine-including
the corollary of esthetic functionality-should be objectively
applied.
III. TRADEMARK PROTECTION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
It has been shown that several types of protection are avail-
able for product configurations. The most generally available of
these is the Lanham Act, but such protection may not be desir-
able for a number of reasons which are discussed in this section.
66. Id. at 464.
67. But cf. John Toberts Mfg. Co. v. University of Notre Dame du
Lac, 258 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1958), affg 152 F. Supp. 269 (N.D. Ind. 1957)
(injunction granted against imitation of Notre Dame class ring).
68. Haeger Potteries, Inc. v. Gilner Potteries, 123 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.
Cal. 1954).
69. Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-
Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
882 (1955).
70. 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
71. Id. at 930. In a concurring opinion, Judge Rich found the issue
worth discussion, but concluded that the wine decanter was not estheti-
ically functional because protection would not hinder competition, and
loss of the right to copy would not take anything of value from the cop-
ier. 328 F.2d at 933.
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A. UNsouND BASES
One major reason for objecting to Lanham Act protection
for product configurations is that the theoretical bases for this
extension of trademark registration are unsound. Accordingly,
expansion of the Act to cover this new field may not only be
unwarranted but also dangerous.
1. The Sears and Compco Decisions
Two 1964 Supreme Court cases, Sears, Roebuck and Co. v.
Stiffel Co.72 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,73 sug-
gest that protection against copying-other than that afforded
by the constitutionally authorized patent system- is not permis-
sible. The Sears case involved the sale by Sears of an exact copy
of a pole lamp originally manufactured by the Stiffel Co., on
which Stiffel had procured both design and mechanical patents.
Compco had copied a cross-ribbed reflector used in a lighting fix-
ture, originally manufactured and design patented by Day-Brite.
All the patents had been held invalid by district courts.7 4 There
had been no finding, however, that either defendant was passing
off its goods as those of the original manufacturer. In Sears
there was no evidence of customer confusion about source, and
the evidence of source confusion in Compco suggested that it oc-
curred after the fixtures were in use, not at the time of pur-
chase.75
On review, the United States Supreme Court ruled that state
courts may not enjoin the copying of an article unprotected by
patent or copyright, since such an injunction would be inconsist-
ent with federal patent and copyright policy.76 The effect of
72. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
73. 376 U.S. 234 (1964). Both cases are extensively discussed in
Product Simulation Symposium, 64 COLum. L. Rav. 1178 (1964).
74. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 235 (1964).
75. The evidence was that fixtures made by one manufacturer were
sent to another for repair.
Not only is this incident suggestive only of confusion after a pur-
chase had been made, but also there is considerable evidence of
the care taken by Compco to prevent customer confusion, includ-
ing clearly labelling both the fixtures and the containers in
which they were shipped and not selling through manufacturer's
representatives who handled competing lines.
376 U.S. at 237 (emphasis in original).
76. Justice Black's opinion in Compco seems to find in the Consti-
tution and federal patents statutes a right to copy which conflicts with
state power to issue injunctions against imitation. The right to copy ex-
ists at common law, however, and is therefore not dependent upon those
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these decisions on the scope of Lanham Act protection is not
clear. If the decisions are interpreted as being of constitutional
dimension, the provisions of the Lanham Act which seemingly
permit trademark protection of objects and configurations might
then arguably be unconstitutional and invalid as restrictions
on the right to copy.77 Thus, Justice Black, who wrote the
majority opinion in both cases, stated that "[t]o forbid copying
would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl.
8, of the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes,
of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and
copyright laws leave in the public domain. '7 8  Other language
in the majority opinions, however, appears to retreat from this
apparently clear statement of a constitutional basis and instead
indicates possible reliance on statutory preemption doctrines.
79
Moreover, it can be argued that trademark protection is not pre-
cluded by Sears and Compco even if the decisions are constitu-
tional in nature, since registration arguably does not prohibit
copying the article but merely bars its use for the same or a
similar purpose. The protection afforded therefore does not fall
within the sphere of Sears and Compco and would not be uncon-
stitutional.8 0
Even if Sears and Compco rest only on federal preemption
doctrines, arguments that these cases rule out Lanham Act pro-
tection for objects remain. One argument is simply that any
attempt to rationalize the trademark act with the patent statutes
as interpreted by the Supreme Court requires preservation of
the right to copy. A more imaginative argument reflects the ob-
servation that the Lanham Act only permits registration of exist-
sources. Leeds, Product Simulation Symposium, 64 CoLum. L. lEv. 1179,
1181 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Leeds].
77. Thus protection of many configurations on the Supplemental
Register under section 23 of the Lanham Act, and on the Principal Reg-
ister under section 2(f) as affected by section 23, would be precluded.
See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
78. 376 U.S. at 237.
79. The language suggests that the conflict is with federal statutes
rather than with the Constitution itself: "As we have said in Sears,...
the federal patent laws prevent a state from prohibiting the copying and
selling of unpatented articles. . . ." Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Light-
ing, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964). A possible explanation for this confu-
sion is that Justice Black, who was not noted for any fear of making
constitutional decisions, could not garner sufficient support to couch the
opinion in completely constitutional terms. Cf. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Con-
vertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 522 (1964) (Black, J., dis-
senting), in which Justice Black refers to "the constitutional plan of a
competitive economy."
80. See text accompanying notes 119-126 infra.
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ing rights: it does not create new ones.81 Under this theory,
the effect of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the patent
statutes is to deny that there are existing source identification
rights, thus leaving nothing to be registered under the Lanham
Act.
Whatever interpretation is given to the Sears and Compco
decisions, however, one thing is clear: they represent a strong
endorsement of the competitive economy and the right to copy.8 2
This fact alone undercuts the theoretical basis for protection of
product configurations under the Lanham Act.
2. Improper Judicial Motivation
Some courts have apparently based their protection of shapes
and product configurations upon a moralistic reaction to what
these courts perceive as outrageous actions by copiers. For ex-
ample, in Compco, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
concluded that Compco's actions violated "old fashioned Hon-
esty. '8 3 An even better example is the opinion of Judge Medina
in American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber,84 which concerned
the detailed copying of a product on which the patent had ex-
pired. Judge Medina, though recognizing the importance of imi-
tation,85 decried the defendant's "willful and cunningly contrived
81. qt is our understanding of the Lanham Act that it is for the
registration, not the creation, of trademarks. Its terminology-indeed,
the history of federal trademark statutes-presupposes the pre-existence
of a trademark to be registered." Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Electric
Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 904 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (emphasis in origi-
nal). See also S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 181-82
(2d Cir. 1949) (Clark, J., dissenting); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289
F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
82. Language in In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1349 (C.C.P.A.
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3349 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1974), suggests that
the lessons of Sears and Compco are irrelevant to that case:
Nor do we believe that the language of the opinions in Sears,
Roebuck and Co. v. Stiffel Co. and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., which were concerned with the conflict between
a state's law of unfair competition and the federal patent law,
is pertinent to the present issue of registrability for federal
trademark protection (citations omitted).
The Sears and Compco decisions are clearly relevant, however, in en-
dorsing the right to copy and may also reflect constitutional limitations
which would determine the Honeywell case. See text accompanying
notes 76-81 supra.
83. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 30 (7th
Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
84. 269 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915 (1959).
85. 'For imitation is the lifeblood of competition. It is the unim-
peded availability of substantially equivalent units that permits the nor-
1975]
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pirating."' 6  Judge Clark dissented in an opinion which pointed
out the inappropriateness of emotive terms such as "poach," "de-
ceitful," and "fraudulent. 8 7
It seems apparent that the moral outrage evidenced by the
courts in many of these cases reflects a perceived violation of
some property rights which the plaintiff is thought to hold.
8 8
The patent and copyright laws, however, were designed to estab-
lish a property right that had not previously existed, in deroga-
tion of a conceded common-law right to copy.8 9 The essential
circularity of this attempt to reach a decision on the basis of
perceived rights is apparent if one considers that the more
modern conception of property is as a collection of rights and
obligations that society either protects or requires. This con-
ception makes it clear that the nature of any property involved
is only a reflection of the preliminary decision as to the extent
of protection that will be afforded. Neither the motivation of
the copier nor the sensibilities of the judge should be a factor
in deciding whether a copied item is to be protected, except to
the extent that the copier is shown to have deceived the public
about the source of his goods.
3. Foreign Trademark Protection
There is substantial evidence that the drafters of the Lan-
ham Act created the Supplemental Register to assist American
manufacturers in obtaining foreign protection of their trade-
marks.9 0 Some countries refuse to respect trademarks unless
they are also protected in the country of origin. 91 It is therefore
possible to argue that at least supplemental registration should
be broadly extended to product shapes and configurations in or-
der to avoid prejudicing international trade possibilities. Denial
of supplemental registration of shapes and objects, however, will
only interfere with foreign protection of that class of symbols:
it will leave intact the registration of more traditional two-
mal operation of supply and demand to yield the fair price which society
must pay for a given commodity." Id. at 272.
86. Id. at 270.
87. Id. at 277.
88. Even the terminology of the court's outrage reflects violation
of property rights; for example, Judge Medina refers to "piracy," "pirat-
ing," and "poaching." Id. at 270, 272.
89. See note 93 infra.
90. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
91. See In re Pepsi-Cola Co., 120 U.S.P.Q. 468, 469 (Dec. Com. Pat.
1959).
[Vol. 59:541
TRADEMARK PROTECTION
dimensional trademarks. Furthermore, this argument raises
serious questions as to the extent to which interference with
domestic competitive mechanisms should be accepted to obtain
a dubious international advantage. Thus, although the goal of
securing foreign trademark protection supports extension of the
Lanham Act's coverage to product configurations, it is not really
a substantial reason for doing so.
B. Tim ECONOMC EFFECTS OF TRADEmARK PROTECTION FOR
OBJECTS: PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION VERSUS
SOURCE IDENTIFICATION
A major factor in any decision to extend trademark protec-
tion to shapes and objects must be the economic effect which
any such extension would have. Public policy in this area favors
free competition 92 and thus preservation of the right to copy. 93
Conversely, trademark protection of objects is certain to have
some deleterious effect on competition: the Commissioner of
Patents has characterized such protection as a monopoly on the
protected item,94 which allows the registrant to exclude any
other supplier from direct competition. The scope of this per-
ceived monopoly is an important factor in determining whether
such protection should be afforded,95 and thus it becomes neces-
sary to examine carefully the specific economic effects of any ex-
panded prohibition of imitation.
Trademark protection of product shapes or configurations
may enhance either or both of two forms of identification. The
consumer may use the registered shape or configuration to iden-
tify the product or type of product which he wishes to purchase,9 6
92. "Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or
trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed .y all-and in the free
exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested." Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
93. The right to copy is a right which exists under the common law.
Id. at 116; In re Deister Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1961). See
also Leeds, supra note 76, at 1180.
94. "[Wlhile a patent is issued for only a limited term, a trade-
mark becomes the permanent property of its owner and secures for him
a monopoly in perpetuity." Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Cranston, 150 F.
Supp. 861, 862 (D.D.C. 1957).
95. See text accompanying notes 119-26 infra.
96. Professor Treece suggests the Skotch Kooler as an example.
Hamilton Skotch Corporation began producing a cylindrical beverage
cooler in 1951, which by 1957 was being imitated. The question Treece
poses is whether purchasers sought only a cylindrical, plaid-decorated
cooler or desired the Hamilton-Skotch product specifically. Treece, Pro-
tectability of Product Differentiatiow Is and Ought Compared, 18 RUT-
GERS L. REv. 1019, 1019-20 (1964).
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or the consumer may use the protected feature to identify the
supplier of the product. The former pattern of identification has
been characterized by Professor Treece as product differentia-
tion,97 which he argues has four significant anticompetitive
effects. First, it permits the seller to acquire a control over price
which he could not otherwise maintain.98 Second, product dif-
ferentiation impedes rational individual purchase decisions.99
Third, it adds to the cost of production and marketing by requir-
ing expenditures for differentiation not related to the quality or
actual needs of the product.100 Fourth, entry into an industry
is made more expensive because of higher initial losses while the
consumer learns to identify the product by a new shape.10 1 Treece
argues that consumers concerned about source can be adequately
informed by labelling,10 2 without suffering the anticompetitive
effects which result from the protection of product or container
configurations.
The second identification pattern, which might well be
termed source identification or differentiation, occurs when the
consumer uses the shape or configuration of a product to identify
the manufacturer or supplier. This pattern is an expression of
the concept of secondary meaning and is the one which trade-
mark registration is theoretically intended to protect.10 3 Source
identification has long been recognized as an important factor
in maintaining accountability and competitive quality.10 4
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1020. The suggestion is that if a manufacturer can differ-
entiate his product in appearance and protect the distinction, purchasers
will buy the product even though the quality level is no higher than
a nondifferentiated product.
99. Id. at 1021. Treece suggests that purchase decisions are often
made on the basis of advertising, with little thought as to relative quality
or source of goodg.
100. Id. An example is the cost of yearly car model changes.
101. Id. at 1022.
102. This is apparently Justice Black's position in Sears and Compco
as well. See text accompanying notes 72-82 supra.
103. This identification pattern has been thought to be valuable be-
cause it allows the copier to share in the goodwill of the product, but
not of the producer. "From the Kellogg case, the conclusion is to be
drawn that one who claims that another is guilty of unfair competition
in copying his product, must show that the consuming public is primarily
concerned in the producer, rather than in the product itself.. . ." West
Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 589 (6th Cir. 1955).
See also Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilbourn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 300
(2d Cir. 1917).
104. See F. ScmEcaus, H-sToaRcA FOuNDATIONS OF THE LAw RELATING
To TRADEmARKs 47, 129-30 (1925).
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The economic effects of trademark protection for objects
must therefore be considered positive insofar as they prevent
consumer source confusion and negative to the extent that they
prevent the operation of the usual competitive processes. If the
desired source identification can be assured through labelling or
other procedures, therefore, the anticompetitive effects of prod-
uct differentiation make a strong argument for denying trade-
mark protection.
One example of a court's attempt to weigh these countervail-
ing effects is Lucian Lelong Inc. v. George W. Button Corp.,105
an unfair competition case. The Lelong court granted an injunc-
tion prohibiting defendant's continued use of a perfume bottle
very similar to that of the plaintiff. The court rejected labelling
as a method of protecting source identification, noting that the
eventual location of the perfume bottle would be the boudoir
rather than the pantry, and that any label large enough to be
effective in identifying the manufacturer would destroy the
value of the product.1 6 The apparent conclusion of the court
was thus that the anticompetitive effects of product differentia-
tion must be suffered for lack of a reasonable method by which
to protect source identification. Even if the court's rather sum-
mary dismissal of labelling was justifiable in Lelong, it is clear
that similar holdings in cases involving thermostats, liquor
bottles, wine decanters and the like are less convincing. Because
labelling will effectively protect source identification in the sub-
stantial majority of cases, 107 the reasonable course would nor-
mally be to avoid competitive difficulties by restricting trade-
mark protection.
C. CONFICT WITH TIM PATENT SYSTEM
1. Judicial Development of the Interplay Between Patents and
Trademarks
General acceptance of the availability of Lanham Act pro-
tection for three-dimensional objects would make conflict or
overlap with the protection afforded by patents, particularly
design patents, inevitable. This section will consider how inter-
action between those two forms of protection bears on whether
the trademark laws should be so extended.
105. 50 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
106. Id. at 710.
107. See text accompanying note 179 infra.
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Traditionally, courts have held that a trademark registration
cannot be obtained during or after the life of a design patent.108
The rationale in many cases has been that to allow a trademark
on a shape or design would provide an unlimited monopoly on
that item in direct conflict with the expressly limited term of
a patent.10 9 The substantial body of cases that have adopted this
rationale" are illustrative of what may be termed the "quid pro
quo" theory of patents."' This theory holds that the patent
grant is a contract between society and the inventor under which
the inventor agrees to dedicate his invention to the common weal
in return for a complete monopoly over a limited term." 2 Trade-
mark protection of the very item which had been design patented
would be inconsistent with that postulate: it would extend the
monopoly and thus destroy the careful balance of interests which
the theory suggests lies behind the patent principle.
Recently some courts-most notably the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals-have begun to repudiate the quid pro quo
theory. In one such case, Ex parte Caron Corp.,"" the Commis-
sioner compared the purpose and function of design patents and
trademarks. He found that, while the function of the design pa-
tent is to "protect the patentee in his right to exclude others
from making, using or selling the article,"" 4 the trademark func-
108. See, e.g., Ex parte Mars Signal-Light Corp., 85 U.S.P.Q. 173
(Dec. Com. Pat. 1950).
109. "The Trade Mark Act of 1946 clearly was not intended to repeal
the law as to design patents and it is not believed that an alternate form
of protection, without limitation as to time could have been intended."
Id. at 176.
110. In re Deister Concentrator Co., Inc., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A.
1961); In re Shakespeare Co., 289 F.2d 506 (C.C.P.A. 1961). Two cases
which postdate the apparent rejection of the quid pro quo theory by the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Mogen David Wine Corp.,
328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964), involved requests for trademark protection
of items that had previously been protected by utility patents. In Best
Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195 (C.C.P.A. 1969), and In
re Shenange Ceramics, Inc., 362 F.2d 287 (C.C.P.A. 1966), the court held
that the patents established the functionality of the items and denied
trademark protection. This achieves the quid pro quo result without ac-
cepting the theory. The opinion of the Shenange court, however, left
some doubt as to its position on the theory by speaking of the patented
item as having entered the public domain and thus become inappropriate
for protection. Id. at 292.
111. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111(1938).
112. Utility patents are granted for 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
Design patents are granted for 3 , 7, or 14 years at the election of the
applicant. Id. § 173.
113. 100 U.S.P.Q. 356 (Dec. Com. Pat. 1954).
114. Id. at 358.
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tions "to indicate origin of goods-to identify and distinguish the
goods of one person from those of another."'15 The purpose of
the design patent, the Commissioner found, is to "grant exclu-
sivity of the design of the article to the patentee for a term of
years as a reward for his ultimate contribution to the public of
something new, original and ornamental. The patent affords
protection to the design itself."116 The purposes of the trade-
mark, on the other hand, are to protect the source identification
rights of the public as well as the good will of the product and
business." 7 The Commissioner then concluded that, since the
statutes differ both in function and purpose, a trademark does
not constitute an extension of the monopoly period." 8 The
rather formal structure of this argument, which disdains any
factual consideration of whether the patent monopoly is effect-
ively extended, is apparent.
A different way of stating the argument which suggests that
the two protections do not conflict was offered in In re Pepsi-
Cola Co. 1 9 In that case, the court held that while a design patent
allows the patentee to prevent any manufacture or use of the
protected subject, 20 trademark protection is of a more limited
scope and only registers the holder's right to use the mark as
an identifier of his goods.121 In other words, a copier would pre-
sumably have the right to use a whiskey bottle 22 to hold flowers,
or a wine decanter 23 to sell milk, so long as the result or intent
was not to cause source confusion. The difficulty with this sug-
gestion appears most graphically if one tries to imagine what
other use could reasonably be made of a thermostat cover,12 4 or
of a tape dispenser. 25 When three-dimensional objects are in-
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 359.
119. 120 U.S.P.Q. 468 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
120. Under the law of trade secrets, independent creation or "reverse
engineering" could legitimately be used to deprive the originator of his
exclusive use. However, under the patent statute the holder of a patent
can prohibit any such duplication. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 491 (1974).
'121. 120 U.S.P.Q. at 468. See also Ex parte Caron Corp., 100 U.S.P.Q.
356 (Dec. Com. Pat. 1954).
122. See Ex parte Haig & Haig Ltd., 118 U.S.P.Q. 229 (Dec. Com.
Pat. 1958).
123. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A.
1964). See text accompanying notes 134-36 infra.
124. See In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1974), cert.
denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3349 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1974). See text accompanying
notes 137-43 infra.
125. See Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. 74 (Pat.
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volved, the verbal distinctions which these courts have attempted
to draw between patent and trademark protection represent al-
most no significant difference in reality. The actual effect of
the argument is thus to allow the trademark holder almost com-
plete rights in the object, effectively extending the limited mon-
opoly originally granted by the design patent.12 6
A second, more straightforward, type of attack on the quid
pro quo theory is the argument that the right to copy was not
created by the patent laws, but rather is a pre-existing common
law right.127 The inventor therefore cannot grant that right
in exchange for his monopoly. What he does give up is secrecy;
that is, he discloses his invention in return for the proffered
monopoly. The inventor therefore has satisfied his obligation at
the beginning of the patent term, and nothing should prevent
him from seeking trademark protection at the end of the monop-
oly period. If the nature of the item is such that trademark
protection will assure near monopoly, however, it seems difficult
to locate the public's "quid" under this theory.1 28
Another way in which patent and trademark protection may
interact involves the trademark requirements of commercial use
and secondary meaning. One of the requirements for supple-
mental registration is a period of use of the mark in commerce, 2 9
and graduation to the Principal Register requires that the symbol
be shown to have acquired a secondary meaning as an indicator
of the product's source.13 0  Obviously, either of these require-
ments would be more easily met during the monopoly period of
an existing patent, since the manufacturer could exclude similar
objects from the marketplace during that time, thus frustrating
the commercial viability prerequisites of the Lanham Act. A
suggested solution is to require that the necessary trademark
Off. Exam. Chief 1952). Registration was refused in this case on the
ground that configurations and containers could not be registered on the
Principal Register.
126. In light of the limited term of the patent monopoly, see note
112 supra, the very high failure rate of design patents, see note 40 supra,
and the essentially monopolistic protection afforded by trademark pro-
tection in some cases, it seems at least arguable that trademark protec-
tion may be more substantial.
127. See note 93 supra.
128. See text accompanying notes 119-26 supra.
129. "All marks . . . which have been in lawful use in commerce
by the proprietor thereof, upon or in connection with any goods or serv-
ices for the year preceding the filing of the application .. " 15 U.S.C.§ 1091 (1970).
130. See note 10 sspra,
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standards be met after the expiration of the patent period;13 1
this result has apparently been endorsed in one case.13 2 There
are, however, two difficulties with the proposed solution. First,
if secondary meaning has already been established during the
monopoly period, any further waiting period can only be arbi-
trary. It would be difficult to prove that something which was
previously established has now been independently re-estab-
lished, especially when the concept in question is one as tenuous
as that of secondary meaning. Second, since both the commercial
use and secondary meaning requirements appear designed to put
the symbol to the test of the marketplace before protection will
be afforded, use of the patent monopoly for establishing the prod-
uct would seem to frustrate the policy behind the Lanham Act
requirements. Professor Treece has suggested that a substan-
tially longer waiting period could be required of a patentee who
applies for trademark protection, so as to counterbalance the
higher costs and risks which competitors of the fully differen-
tiated product would incur upon entering the market when the
patent expires. 33 The suggested solution is thus fatally flawed;
moreover, no other fair method appears to prevent use of the
patent monopoly to frustrate the marketplace requirements of
the trademark act, if both patent and trademark protection are
to be allowed.
It is therefore clear that a pragmatic, rather than a formalis-
tic, consideration of the interplay of patent and trademark shows
that trademark protection can amount to an effective extension
of the patent monopoly. Difficulty also arises in reconciling the
patent monopoly and the trademark market requirements. Both
these problems suggest the need to restrict the overlap of patent
and trademark protection.
2. The Honeywell and Mogen David Cases
Despite the apparent conflicts between the two forms of pro-
tection, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has held in
131. Diaz & Rotert, Principal Registration of Contours of Packages
and Containers Under the Trademark Act of 1946, 27 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
104, 127 (1958).
132. In Ex parte Caron Corp., 100 U.S.P.Q. 356, 360 (Dec. Com. Pat.
1954), the Commissioner stated that use of a perfume bottle under the
patent "probably was not a use which would entitle it to claim any rights
under the trademark laws." However, the Commissioner found suffi-
cient use after the item entered the public domain, and allowed supple-
mental registration.
133. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
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two cases that registration on the Principal Register is permis-
sible after the expiration of a valid design patent. In the first
case, Mogen David Wine Corporation applied to have its wine
decanter listed on the Principal Register. The Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board refused to order registration, holding that
trademark protection would constitute an illegal extension of the
design patent which the company already held on the decanter. 13 4
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals reversed, holding that
"trademark rights, or rights under the law of unfair competition,
which happen to continue beyond the expiration of a design
patent, do not 'extend' the patent monopoly. They exist inde-
pendently of it, under different law and for different reasons." 135
The case was then remanded for a determination of whether
secondary meaning had in fact been established.13 6
Ten years later, the same court in In re Honeywell, Inc.13 7
held that it was error for the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
to have refused to order principal registration of the round cover
of the Honeywell thermostat.138 This configuration had been
covered by a design patent that expired while the trademark ap-
plication was pending.139 The Trademark Examiner had refused
registration on: the grounds that the configuration was func-
tional and therefore not capable of being a trademark, 40 and
that the existence of the previous design patent did not "enhance
applicant's attempt to secure trademark protection for the same
subject matter."'141 The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board af-
134. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 134 U.S.P.Q. 576 (T.T.A.B. 1962),
rev'd, 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
135. 328 F.2d at 930.
136. On remand, the Board held that the applicant had not made
a sufficient showing of secondary meaning and denied registration. In
re Mogen David Wine Corp., 145 U.S.P.Q. 85 (T.T.A.B. 1965).
137. 497 F.2d 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3349
(U.S. Dec. 17, 1974).
138. In re Honeywell, Inc., 169 U.S.P.Q. 619 (T.T.A.B. 1971). The
configuration involved is a smooth outer ring with a clear plastic center,
and comprises nearly the entire visible part of the thermostat. Examples
are omnipresent; Honeywell claims to have sold more than twenty mil-
lion of these covers. Id. at 621.
139. See id. at 620.
140. The examiner stated that the configuration "is so fundamentally
functional and utilitarian that the matter applied for is incapable of ac-
quiring a legally recognizable secondary meaning or of becoming an en-
forceable trademark." 497 F.2d at 1345. The doctrine that functional ob-jects are not capable of serving as indicia of source purports to be a fact
determination, but is not rebuttable and is therefore, in reality, a rule
of law. See text accompanying notes 41-71 infra.
141. 497 F.2d at 1345.
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firmed the Examiner's decision without addressing the function-
ality question, holding directly that the trademark protection
sought would constitute an illegal extension of the design
patent. 42 The Board distinguished the Mogen David holding by
noting that the wine bottle in that case was only the container
for the product, whereas the Honeywell -application pertained to
a part of the product itself. 43 On appeal, the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals reemphasized what it had held in Mogen Da-
vid to be clear differences between the bases of trademark and
design patent protection, and reversed the Board, 4 4 remanding
the case for consideration of the functionality issue. The Supreme
Court has recently denied certiorari in the case.
The Honeywell and Mogen David cases represent the only
two instances in which courts have dealt with the overlap bet-
ween design patents and the substantial safeguards afforded by
principal registration. They demonstrate that at least the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals is unwilling to limit the apparent
conflict between the patent and trademark laws to the Supple-
mental Register. This result is subject to all of the criticisms
previously raised; indeed, it is even less defensible because list-
ing on the Principal Register approximates monopoly protection
more closely than inclusion on the Supplemental Register. The
cases thus graphically illustrate the need for courts to limit
trademark protection of shapes and configurations.
D. PROTECTION OF SUBPATENTABLE ITEMs
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that trademarks may
indeed afford for some objects protection which approximates a
patent monopoly. Since the trademark requirements do not in-
clude the prerequisite that the object show any level of innova-
142. "[R]egistration must be refused on the ground that the regis-
tration sought by applicant would extend the monopoly which the appli-
cant has enjoyed for a period of fourteen years from the issuance of the
design patent on January 17, 1956." 169 U.S.P.Q. at 621.
143. Id. at 622. This distinction does not seem tenable. Although
the cover will stay with the thermostat as long as the product is in use,
the wine bottle is certainly likely to accompany the wine until consump-
tion, and the bottle, if sufficiently decorative, may continue to be used
long after. Although the product/container distinction does suggest a
way of defeating the Honeywell application, it would introduce complex
and unnecessary questions of how the distinction is to be made.
144. 497 F.2d at 1348-49.
145. 43 U.S.L.W. 3349 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1974).
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tion, however, trademark registration can provide a monopoly
of infinite duration for objects that could not be granted even
the limited term protection allowed by the patent clause of the
United States Constitution. To the extent that patent protection
for the "limited times"'46 specified in the Constitution is read as
exclusive,147 such use of trademark registration is arguably un-
constitutional. At the least, such an interpretation of the Lan-
ham Act seems to be in conflict with the intent of the patent
statutes.
This problem would still exist even if the quid pro quo
theory of patents were more rigorously enforced, since the ob-
jects in question here are concededly non-patentable. In fact,
forced to a choice between short-term patent protection and in-
finite trademark protection, many manufacturers might aban-
don the design patent. 48 This seems particularly likely in light
of the high failure rate of the design patents when tested in
court.14 9
IV. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF RESTRICTING
TRADEMARK REGISTRATION
The arguments which have been examined suggest that
trademark registration of objects and shapes should be curtailed.
Such a policy would beneficially affect commerce. Source identi-
fication could be maintained.' 50 ' Curtailment of Lanham Act pro-
tection of configurations would also alleviate the conflict between
the patent and trademark systems and enhance the competitive
economy endorsed in the Sears and Compco cases. A possible
adverse effect of curtailment, however, would be a reduction of
available foreign trademark protection. This section will con-
sider alternative methods of implementing such a restriction of
trademark registration.
146. U.S. COxST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
147. See text accompanying note 76 supra.
148. Abandonment of the design patent system may not be to soci-
ety's detriment, however. Since the courts refuse to enforce most design
patents, see note 40 supra, the theoretical monopoly is a doubtful phe-
nomenon. It therefore seems unlikely that possible design patent protec-
tion acts as a significant stimulus to the creation of new ornamental de-
signs.
149. See note 40 supra.
150. "The literacy rate is high enough in the United States, after all,
to justify the courts in requiring consumers who care about source to
read names on labels." Treece, Copying Methods of Product Differentia-
tion, 38 Nom. DAi.E LAW. 244, 261 (1962).
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A. UNCONSTITUIONALY OR INCONSISTENCY Wrm
PATENT STATUTES
One possible way in which trademark protection could be re-
stricted would be by a Supreme Court decision that Sears arid
Compco rest on constitutional grounds, thus making section 23
of the Lanham Act unconstitutional as conflicting with the pat-
ents clause. 1 1 This solution is unlikely to be adopted in light
of the Court's reluctance to render constitutional decisions. Al-
ternatively, the Court could declare that registration of objects
should be abandoned as a matter of reconciling the two statutes.
Either of these solutions, however, would only address the prob-
lem of conflict with the patent statutes; presumably neither
would significantly restrict registration of subpatentable config-
urations, unless object registration under the Lanham Act were
to be completely eliminated.152 A further difficulty with a rem-
edy of this nature would be the necessity of defining what is
subpatentable: 153 the patent office standard for issuance of a
design patent is clearly quite different from the standard em-
ployed by the courts to evaluate its validity.'"
B. THE QuiD PRO Quo THEORY
A vigorous enforcement of the quid pro quo theory of patents
would eliminate trademark protection of objects which had re-
ceived patent protection. Like the previous solution, this would
not effectively limit the registration of subpatentable items.
Furthermore, its effect would be to offer the manufacturer a
choice between patent and trademark.'5 5 In light of the limited
time period and poor enforcement rate which characterize design
patents, many applicants would surely opt for trademark protec-
tion. Therefore, although this alternative is a reasonable way
to rationalize the statutes, it might well fail almost completely
151. See text accompanying notes 72-82 supra.
152. Such a result could be premised on a finding that the patent
clause was intended to occupy the field fully, thus defining a subpatent-
able area within which neither Congress nor the states could create any
monopolies. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
153. The difficulty in deciding which configurations might fall in the
patentable zone suggests the desirability of avoiding confusion by refus-
ing registration to all such items. Though this may seem extreme, it
must be remembered that the configurations incapable of achieving
patent protection have failed to achieve a significant degree of innovation
or novelty. See note 31 supra.
154. See note 40 supra.
155. see note 126 supra.
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as a method of restricting trademark registration of objects. The
problems concerning the unsound theoretical foundation for
trademark protection of product configurations and the economic
problems discussed earlier would still remain.
C. RESTRICTING OBJECTS TO THE SUPPLEMiENTAL REGISTER
A third remedy would be that of limiting configurations and
objects to the Supplemental Register. This would avoid possible
limitations on trademark protection in foreign countries. It
would eliminate the prima facie right to the mark and the incon-
testability after five years which is assured by the Principal Reg-
ister.15 6 The primary difficulty with this suggestion is that there
appears to be no satisfactory way to implement it short of con-
gressional revision of the Lanham Act. The obvious solution
would seem to be construction of section 2(f) of the Lanham Act
-which governs listings on the Principal Register-as excluding
all of the items included in section 23-which applies to the Sup-
plemental Register. This solution would not necessarily be in-
consistent with the overall structure of the statute if the creation
of the Supplemental Register was shown to exist for some pur-
pose beyond that of a stepping stone to the Principal Register. 57
Unfortunately, the words of the statute do not seem to support
such a construction. 158 Section 2(f) uses the word "mark," which
is generally applicable to the Supplemental Register, rather than
"trademark," which relates to the Principal Register. Further-
more, section 2(f) cites sections 2(a) through (d) as the only ex-
ceptions to the general rule allowing principal registration of any
mark, whatever its form, which has become distinctive of the ap-
plicant's goods.159 None of these subsections show any promise
156. See text accompanying notes 11-16 and 19-21 supra. Reducing
the range of configurations allowed on the Principal Register would, of
course, reduce the conflict between the patent and trademark systems.
157. One purpose for its existence, for example, might be as a solu-
tion to the foreign trademark registration problem. See text accompany-
ing notes 22-24 supra.
158. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 930-31(C.C.P.A. 1964). But see the argument in In re Deister Concentrator Co.,
289 F.2d 496, 502 (C.C.P.A. 1961), suggesting that the language of section
2(f) does not mandate such registrations, and the discussion in Ex parte
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. 74 (Pat. Off. Exam. Chief
1952), where registration was refused on the basis that configurations
and containers cannot be registered on the Principal Register.
159. Subsection (a) deals with immoral matter; subsection (b) for-
bids use of flags or insignia of states or nations; subsection (c) prohibits
registration of marks comprising names of living individuals without
their consent or of deceased Presidents without the consent of the surviv-
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as a basis for denying principal registration to configurations. 160
Another possible method of limiting configurations to the Sup-
plemental Register would be a uniform presumption that such
configurations are not capable of achieving secondary meaning,
and thus are ineligible for the Principal Register. There is no
support for such an idea in case law, however, and it would seem
to be in direct conflict with the scheme of the statute, which
requires that marks admitted to the Supplemental Register 5e
"capable of distinguishing the applicant's goods."'' Moreover,
this third remedy would still permit the evils of object registra-
tion to the extent that such protection is given by the Supple-
mental Register.162
D. A RETURN TO FUxcTioNALry
The fourth possible way of curtailing registrations of shapes
and configurations would be to reinforce the doctrine of function-
ality. Strict enforcement of the functionality doctrine, including
the concept of esthetic functionality, would drastically curtail the
range of three-dimensional objects which could be registered.( 3
ing widow; and subsection (d) deals with confusion among marks. 15
U.S.C. § 1052 (1970).
160. Subsection (e) denies registration to marks which are merely
descriptive. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e) (1970). Judge Rich, concurring in In
re Mcflhenney Co., 278 F.2d 953, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1960), argued that a two-
ounce pepper sauce bottle is pictorial and merely descriptive of the prod-
uct, which is a bottle of pepper sauce, and therefore not registrable.
However, because only subsections (a) through (d) are stated as excep-
tions to the inclusive language of section 2 (f), subsection (e) should not
bar principal registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (f) (1970).
161. 15U.S.C. § 1091 (1970).
162. Careful scrutiny of applications for the presence of secondary
meaning would alleviate the problem somewhat. An example of such
scrutiny is the Mogen David case. The Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals remanded the case to the Board to determine the factual issue
of whether the decanter operated as a trademark. 328 F.2d at 932.
On remand, 145 U.S.P.Q. 85 (T.T.A.B. 1965), the Board held that the
applicant had not made a sufficient showing of secondary meaning and
denied registration.
163. The possible problem with this alternative is that language in
the Compco opinion suggests that Justice Black was there rejecting the
functionality doctrine as a test for registrability under the Lanham Act,
at least in unfair competition cases:
That an article copied from an unpatented article could be made
in some other way, that the design is "nonfunctional" and not
essential to the use of either article, that the configuration of
the article copied may have a "secondary meaning" which iden-
tifies the maker to the trade, or that there may be "confusion"
among purchasers as to which article is which or as to who is
the maker, may be relevant evidence in applying a State's law
requiring such precautions as labelling; however, and regardless
1975]
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Shapes could still be registered, but only in the unusual circum-
stance where they perform no marketing or attractiveness func-
tion. Although this solution would theoretically reduce the
number of marks registrable in foreign markets, it would not
affect foreign protection of more traditional types of source iden-
tification.164 An added benefit would be a reduction in the inter-
ference between the trademark and patent systems.
In order for this solution to be effective in minimizing the
registration of shapes and objects, however, the courts must uni-
formly adopt the broad view of functionality offered by the Re-
statement.165 This would make necessary a rejection of balanc-
ing-type tests, 16 which suggest a weighing of functional versus
nonfunctional aspects. A more easily applied test, which would
result in the advantages sought, might be whether the configu-
ration has any significant functional feature, including the en-
hancement of its consumer attractiveness.
V. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION
For the reasons presented, reinforcing the doctrine of func-
tionality appears to be the best solution to the problems explored
in this Note. Because this solution would drastically reduce
the number of instances in which trademark protection is af-
forded to objects, the theoretical problems of such a system
would be minimized, as would conflicts and overlaps with the
patent system. Subpatentable ideas would no longer be protect-
of the copier's motives, neither these facts nor any others canfurnish a basis for imposing liability for or prohibiting the actual
acts of copying and selling.
376 U.S. at 238. Professor Leeds, however, argues that the thing copied
in Sears was the entire article, and thus necessarily functional, and that
the Compco reflector had been held functional in the lower courts. This
reasoning suggests that the functionality doctrine may still be applicable
in state unfair competition law after Sears and Compco. Leeds, supra
note 76, at 1180, 1181. Moreover, regardless of whether Justice Black
intended to reject application of the doctrine to unfair competition, it
should survive as applied in trademark law. In Sears and Compco the
intent of the Court was to broaden the scope of permitted copying. A
broad functionality doctrine would have this same effect when applied
to the Lanham Act in that the scope of congressionally authorized protec-
tion would be restricted.
164. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra. Shapes and config-
urations, however, might play a more necessary role in source identifica-
tion in parts of the world with a substantially lower literacy rate than
the United States. See note 150 supra.
165. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
166. See, e.g. In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 506(C.C.P.A. 1961); In re Simmons Co., 278 F.2d 517, 519 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
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able under the trademark laws, unless they had n6 significant
functional features. Finally, the anticompetitive economic ef-
fects of product differentiation would be avoided to the extent
that manufacturers are denied the infinite monopoly of the Lan-
ham Act.
A matter of some concern, however, is the extent to which
the advantageous effects of the present system can be retained.
The reciprocal foreign protection benefits would probably be
lost,167 but this would be an insubstantial loss at worst. Of
greater import is the possible loss of the source identification be-
havior which present law fosters.1 68 If trademark protection
were to be curtailed, however, there remains a common law doc-
trine which would still be available to preserve the competitive
benefits that flow from the ability of consumers to determine the
source of the goods they purchase: the palming-off doctrine.
The very existence of this doctrine is itself a strong argument
that attempts to provide source identification by trademark pro-
tection of objects and configurations are unnecessary.
The well recognized right to prevent intentional deception
of consumers as to product source is embodied in the palming-off
doctrine. Known as such because it prevents a manufacturer
from palming off his goods as those of another,169 it has occasion-
ally been described as allowing copiers to share in the good will of
the product, but not of the producer.1 70 Cases have held that
a manufacturer can be prevented from labelling his product so
as to create confusion even though the deception is in fact prac-
ticed by a retailer.1'7 1 The doctrine apparently survives unaf-
fected by the Sears and Compco opinions, 17 2 which cast doubt
on the validity of trademark protection for objects. Those de-
cisions indicate that enforcement of the common law prohibi-
tion against palming off goods is not proscribed, at least to the
extent that it eliminates consumer source confusion by requir-
ing labelling.'7 3 Language in the Compco opinion further sug-
167. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
168. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
169. A standard was suggested in Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour &
Co., 175 F.2d 795, 799 (3d Cir. 1949). "The trial judge found as a matter
of fact that 'no intelligent purchaser using reasonable care would be
confused as between the goods of either plaintiff.'"
170. See note 103 supra.
171. Goebel Brewing Co. v. Esslingers, Inc., 373 Pa. 334, 95 A.2d 523
(1953).
172. See text accompanying notes 72-82 supra.
173. "Doubtless a state may . . . require that goods, whether pat-
ented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be
1975]
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gests that a state can impose liability for palming off,17 though
not for the actual act of copying or imitating in the absence of
such a violation. 1 75
It is reasonable to suggest that any limitation on the right to
trademark protection for configurations be accompanied by as-
surances of the ready availability of protection against palming
off.17 6 This might be achieved by statutes permitting the state
to impose labelling requirements upon a showing that source
confusion is likely,177 rather than requiring a showing of actual
consumer confusion in order to grant relief.
Two important aspects of the palming-off doctrine detract
from the appeal of this doctrine. First, it is a common-law doc-
trine and there is therefore no consistent statutory basis for its
application. The protection afforded can and will vary substan-
tially from state to state. Second, the primary method of en-
forcing the doctrine must be by the required labelling of prod-
ucts as to source. As emphasized in the Lucien LeZong cases, this
may entail some loss of esthetic appeal for certain products. : 78
This loss, however, can be alleviated to a significant degree by
recognizing that source identification is important at the time a
purchase decision is made, and not necessarily during the en-
tire span of consumer use.179 Removable labels would therefore
meet the requirement of the law while preserving esthetic ap-
peal.
One further issue which should be considered in connection
taken to prevent competitors from being misled as to the source." Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
174. "A State of course has power to impose liability upon those
who, knowing that the public is relying upon an original manufacturer's
reputation for quality and integrity, deceive the public by palming off
their copies as the original." Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc.,
376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964).
175. "[N] either these facts nor any others can furnish a basis for im-
posing liability for or prohibiting the actual acts of copying and selling."
Id.
176. Thus the competitive benefits of source identification would be
preserved. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
177. Brown, Product Simulation Symposium, 64 CoLm. L. REv. 1216,
1224 (1964).
178. Thus the first Lelong case, Lucien Lelong v. George W. Button
Corp., 50 F. Supp. 708, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), held that labelling the
cologne bottle would destroy its esthetic value, and was thus not avail-
able as a solution. The force of this argument was substantially abated,
however, by the second Lelong case, Lucien Lelong v. Lander Co., 164
F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1947), in which the court found that such labelling
would indeed be effective.
179. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
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with this proposed solution is the effect which a pre-existing
design patent has upon the question of functionality of objects
and shapes. 18 0 A design patent will be valid only if a product's
shape is ornamental and esthetically pleasing.1 81 These quali-
ties, of course, are factors that affect the marketability of the
product and are therefore functional; 8 2 the manufacturer's will-
ingness to invest in the procurement and defense of the patent
is further evidence of the commercial value of the shape. Thus,
two authoritative sources-the patent office and the manufac-
turer-have proclaimed the esthetically functional nature of the
patent item.
Courts could treat these declarations as merely evidencing
functionality, or as presumptively establishing it. 183 Treating
them as evidence would pose difficulties because they are not
cast as evidence, but rather as findings, by entities more closely
attuned to the marketplace than most courts. In addition,
courts would face the difficult task of balancing the manufac-
turer's dispassionate decision to seek the patent against his eco-
180. The Honeywell and Mogen. David cases demonstrate that manu-
facturers will seek both types of protection.
181. See notes 134-45 supra and accompanying text.
The law manifestly contemplates that giving certain new and
original appearance to a manufactured article may enhance its
salable value, may enlarge the demand for it, and may be a mer-
itorious service to the public. It therefore proposes to secure
for a limited time to the ingenious producer of those appearances
the advantages flowing from them. Manifestly the mode in
which those appearances are produced has very little, if any-
thing to do with giving increased salableness to the article.
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1871).
At risk of needlessly restating the commonplace in design patent
law and the elements constituting invention, we note that such
a design must be novel, beautiful, appealing to the eye, and
causing a buying demand for the design.
J.R. Wood & Sons, Inc. v. Abelson's, Inc., 74 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1934).
182. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
183. In two recent cases, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
has considered the effect on the functionality issue of expired utility pat-
ents. In In re Shenange Ceramics, Inc., 362 F.2d 287 (C.C.P.A. 1966)
the court seemingly indicated that the patent would be treated only as
evidence of functionality: "The patent is taken only as some evidence,
here conclusive, that the invoked under-rim configuration is indeed func-
tional" Id. at 292. In Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d
1195 (C.C.P.A. 1969), however, the court in fact adopted the conclusive
evidence rule. The opponent of registration sought summary judgment
on the ground that the applicant's figure-eight-shaped lock core was not
registrable. The court noted that summary judgment would be inappro-
priate if "there is any possibility that there remains a genuine issue of
material fact," and then granted the summary judgment, saying, "it is
clear to us that the Best patent incontrovertably [sic] establishes pri-
mary functionality." Id. at 1199.
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nomically interested claims that the shape is not functional. For
these reasons, the more rational course would be to view a pre-
existing design patent as conclusive evidence of the ornamental-
ity and esthetic functionality of the object or shape.
A finding that a design patent is invalid does not neces-
sarily negate this presumption. In most instances a court will
hold a patent invalid for reasons that do not refute the esthetic
functionality of the shape.184 Even where the shape is deemed
insufficiently ornamental to qualify for a design patent, this
finding may not constitute a denial of that configuration's func-
tionality. The manufacturer may only have been trying to
protect a mechanically functional feature which was not suf-
ficiently innovative to qualify for a utility patent.185 In the
rare case in which a court holds that a shape lacks sufficient
ornamental quality to merit patent protection, that shape may
still be a factor in purchase decisions and thus satisfy the func-
tionality doctrine as endorsed here. Furthermore, the patent ap-
plicant's judgment that the shape possesses ornamental value
would still be relevant. The unlikely possibility that a manu-
facturer will seek to acquire patent protection for a shape that
has no mechanical function or esthetic effect on purchase deci-
sions-thereby losing otherwise available trademark protection-
does not justify foregoing the advantages to be achieved by treat-
ing the design patent as conclusive evidence of functionality.
The cost of such a conclusive rule would not be high.
Courts which correctly apply the suggested test of functionality
would find the disputed shapes to be functional in virtually ev-
ery instance, and the conclusive evidence rule would thus help
assure a broad interpretation of the functionality doctrine. The
rule would effectively reinstate the quid pro quo theory of pat-
ents and would possibly go beyond that theory by denying trade-
mark protection to shapes included in invalid design patents. 8 0
184. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
444 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1970) (obviousness); In re Huntington, 279 F.2d
284 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (previous patent on same material); In re Smith,
77 F.2d 514 (C.C.P.A. 1935) (mere imitation of natural forms).
185. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Guardian Light Co., 267 F.2d 111 (7th
Cir.), cert denied, 361 U.S. 883 (1959); Weisgerber v. Clowney, 131 F.
477 (C.C.N.J. 1904); In re Weil, 201 F.2d 946 (C.C.P.A. 1953).
186. There is nothing unreasonable about this. The courts have
simply determined that the applicant does not have a protectable interest
-no "quid" for society's "quo." No doctrine suggests that ineligibility
for one form of protection should assure eligibility for the other.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Society receives no benefit from the protection afforded to
shapes and objects under the Lanham Act. Consumer respon-
siveness to source identification can be maintained without such
protection, and its elimination would be beneficial to competition.
Strict enforcement of the functionality doctrine, including treat-
ing a design patent as conclusive evidence of functionality, is the
most appealing method of curtailing this superfluous use of the
Lanham Act. This method would not require tortured construc-
tion of the statute and would substantially reduce the perceived
conflict between the patent and trademark systems. It would
also effectively discourage the granting of virtual monopoly pro-
tection to items not showing patentable originality.

